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Abstract
We consider a setting where in a known future time, a certain continuous random variable will be
realized. There is a public prediction that gradually converges to its realized value, and an expert that has
access to a more accurate prediction. Our goal is to study when should the expert reveal his information,
assuming that his reward is based on a logarithmic market scoring rule (i.e., his reward is proportional
to the gain in log-likelihood of the realized value).
Our contributions are: (1) we characterize the expert’s optimal policy and show that it is threshold
based. (2) we analyze the expert’s asymptotic expected optimal reward and show a tight connection
to the Law of the Iterated Logarithm, and (3) we give an efficient dynamic programming algorithm to
compute the optimal policy.
1 Introduction
Consider a futures market. The traders in a futures market make contracts to buy and sell an asset that
will be delivered, and paid for, at a known future date, the delivery date. Traders make money by buying
for less than the market’s spot price on the delivery date, which we shall henceforth call the true price or
value, or by selling for more. In effect, a futures market is a prediction market for the true price.
Consider now an expert in a futures market. An expert is not a trader himself, but someone who is
reputed to have access to a more accurate signal than possessed by regular traders. Often, his reputation
and living is based on this. Stock market analysts, investment gurus and various types of journalists fit this
description.
The expert contributes to a market by making a public prediction. We assume that the expert’s level of
expertise, which we measure by quality and describe below, is known to the market. Then, such a prediction
is a significant market event. Clearly it is optimal for a market to heed an expert whose prediction already
encompasses all current common knowledge and adds to it, but this, in itself, does not say of how much
value any particular expert announcement was to the market, nor indeed, whether it was positive. It is only
at delivery date that the value of an expert’s prediction may be evaluated. Market scoring rules, discussed
below, show how this may be done in a strategy-proof manner. The expert’s reward is proportional to
this value. Whether this reward takes the form of actual compensation, or less tangibly in a boost to his
reputation as an expert, is immaterial to our discussion.
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While we present our work in the context of a market, the market is not strictly necessary. This work
is relevant for any situation where a public is interested in the value of a future continuous variable and
has a time-varying consensus estimate of it. Examples abound: The weather or climate, results of sport
competitions, election results or new book / movie / album sales.
1.1 The Market as a Random Walk
The current price in a futures market represents a current consensus on the true price (assume that interest
rates, or inflation rates, have been incorporated into the price). According to the efficient-market hypothesis
(EMH), the current price represents all currently available information, and therefore it is impossible to
consistently “beat the market”. Consistent with the EMH is the random-walk hypothesis, according to
which stock market prices (and their derivatives) evolve according to a random walk and thus cannot be
predicted. By the random-walk hypothesis, the true price is the result of a random walk from the current
market price. Equivalently, and the point of view we take in this paper, the current price is the result of a
random walk, reversed in time, from the true price.
A random walk adds periodical (say, daily) i.i.d. steps to the market price. Assuming prices have been
adjusted for known trends, the steps have zero mean. By suitable scaling of the price, the step variance
can be normalized to 1. Following a common assumption that the random walk is Gaussian, the steps have
standard normal distribution (i.e., N(0, 1)).
1.2 Expert Quality
An expert’s expertise consists of having a more accurate signal of the predicted price x0 than the market’s,
and the expert’s quality measures by how much. The quality q ∈ [0, 1] measures what part of the market’s
uncertainty the expert “knows”, so that it does not figure in the expert’s own uncertainty. Equivalently, the
expert’s uncertainty is 1−q of the market’s uncertainty. This proportion is statistical: It is the uncertainties’
variances, rather than their realizations, that are related by proportion. If the market price is a Gaussian
random walk from the true price with N(0, 1) steps, the expert’s prediction is a Gaussian random walk from
the true price with N(0, 1− q) steps.
The expert’s knowledge, i.e., the part of the market’s uncertainty that the expert is not uncertain about,
has steps of zero mean and q variance. On the assumption that the expert’s knowledge steps and uncertainty
steps are mutually independent, their sum has the sum mean and sum variance of their parts, i.e., they sum
back to the market’s uncertainty steps of zero mean and variance q + (1− q) = 1.
An expert with q = 1 has no uncertainty at all, and his signal equals the true value x0 at all times t. At
the other extreme, a (so-called) expert with q = 0 has no knowledge beyond common knowledge, and his
signal equals the market value xt at all t.
In this paper an expert’s quality is common knowledge, shared by all traders as well as himself. Whether
its value q represents objective reality, or is a belief, based, e.g., on past performance, makes no difference
to our discussion.
1.3 Scoring a Prediction
A scoring rule is a way to evaluate and reward a prediction of a stochastic event. The predictor declares
at time t > 0 a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(R), and at time 0 some r ∈ R is realized. A scoring rule
S rewards the predictor S(p, r) when her prediction was p and the realized value is r. In market settings,
and many other settings, there exists a current prediction p¯ and then the predictor is evaluated on the
scoring difference effected S(p, r)−S(p¯, r). Note that the optimization problem of the predictor in a market
situation is the same, since he has no influence over S(p¯, r), the only difference is that now the predictor
might be penalized for inaccurate predictions. A proper scoring rule is a scoring rule for which reporting the
true distribution is optimal according to the predictor’s information.1 The logarithmic scoring rule, with
1This is subject to the predictor being allowed a single prediction. Chen et al. (2010), for example, show how a predictor’s
optimal strategy includes bluffing and hiding information when allowed more than one prediction.
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S(p, r) = log pr, scores a prediction by the log-likelihood of the realized value according to the prediction. It
is proper, and so is the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) which scores S(p, r)−S(p¯, r) = log(pr/p¯r)
when the current prediction is p¯ ∈ ∆(R). Conditional on p being the correct distribution, the expected
reward is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between p and p¯: Er∼p[log pr/p¯r] = DKL(p||p¯). While the reward
may be positive or negative, its (conditional) expectation is always non-negative.
In our model expert predictions are scored with LMSR, which the expert maximizes.2 Chen and Pennock
(2010) say “LMSR has become the de facto market maker mechanism for prediction markets. It is used by
many companies including Inkling Markets, Consensus Point, Yahoo!, and Microsoft”.
1.4 The Expert’s Dilemma
Assume that the expert has no obligation to speak at any particular time, or at all. He may make a single
prediction, at a time of his choosing. What time should the expert choose for his prediction?
The expert is aware at all times of the market current price, xt, and of his own prediction yt, where t is
the number of periods remaining to delivery date. He does not know future market prices, or what signals
he will have in the future, but he does know that both will converge on the true price, i.e., x0 = y0. In other
words, whatever value he may bring to the market due to his better signal is gradually dissipating, as the
market’s uncertainty dwindles with the approaching delivery date.
Does that not simply mean that the expert should make a prediction at the earliest opportunity? Not
necessarily. What if at time t the expert observes xt = yt, i.e., that his own prediction coincides with the
market’s? This may occur by chance even though his signal is, on average, less noisy than the market’s.
Announcing his prediction will not change the market price, and so its value is minimal. Waiting is the
better option, since in all probability, in the next period (t − 1), xt−1 6= yt−1, and if not then xt−2 6= yt−2
etc.. The same may be true if xt and yt are not identical but merely close, with what the informal “close”
means needing a formal analysis.
1.5 Summary of Results
Our results shed an interesting light on the expert’s dilemma. Indeed in most cases it is in the expert’s
advantage to wait for the “right” time, when his prediction and the market’s prediction are significantly
different. We show that the optimal policy is a time-dependent threshold on the discrepancy between the
expert and market signals, i.e., on |xt − yt|. We also show a near-optimal policy in which the threshold is
independent of the current time, depending only on the time horizon T and the expert’s quality q.
Another conceptual result is the way quality affects the strategy of an expert in revealing his information.
High-quality experts will tend to wait more, while lower-quality experts will reveal information earlier. For
any time t and discrepancy |xt − yt|, there is a threshold on the quality q∗ such that experts with quality
below q∗ are advised to reveal their information, while experts with quality above it are advised to wait.
Technically, our analysis of the expert’s dilemma shows that the expert strives to maximize a function
of the difference between his signal and the market’s, namely (xt − yt)2/t. The situation he faces is neither
a sub-martingale nor a super-martingale, so no easy recipe guides it. We show that his predict now-or-later
dilemma is optimally decided by a threshold on the value of |xt − yt|. This threshold is proportional to a
universal function θ(t) of the time remaining t, and to
√
q (i.e., good experts speak later). His expected
reward following this optimal policy is governed by another universal function Ψ(t) and by his quality q.
We provide upper and lower bounds for Ψ(T ), where T is the total number of time steps, and show that
it asymptotically limits at 2 log log T . We provide an efficient dynamic-programming algorithm to compute
the Ψ(t) and θ(t) functions, and also provide a calculation for up to t = 107, that shows that our asymptotic
bounds are fairly tight.
2We use LMSR to score expert predictions, but not as a market maker mechanism. Since the expert is not a trader, market
makers are irrelevant.
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1.6 Related Work
The Efficient Market Hypothesis was introduced by Fama et al. (1969). The Random Walk Hypothesis is
even older, originating in the 19th century, and discussed by, e.g., Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1965), and
surveyed in Beechey and Vickery (2000). The Black-Scholes option pricing model Black and Scholes (1973)
is based on a Gaussian random walk assumption.
Scoring rules have a very long history, going back to De Finetti (1937), Brier (1950) and Good (1952),
and are studied in much subsequent work (Sanders (1963), Winkler (1969), Savage (1971), Gneiting and
Raftery (2007)).
Market scoring rules, and the LMSR in particular, were introduced by Hanson (2003) for the study
of prediction markets. Much of the literature of prediction markets is concerned with the liquidity of the
market, and the need of a market maker to facilitate such liquidity for traders. (See Chen and Pennock
(2010) for a survey.) This line of research has unveiled an intriguing connection between the market maker
policy and online learning algorithms Chen and Vaughan (2010); Abernethy et al. (2011). Chen et al. (2010)
studied the strategy of experts who may predict in a single prediction period, and concluded that, under
their model assumptions, experts strive to be the first to make a prediction. Our work uses scoring rules for
their original motivation, rather than market maker and liquidity in prediction markets.
Random walks have been thoroughly investigated. We used the textbook Re´ve´sz (2005) as a general
reference. It discusses Khintchine’s Law of the Iterated Logarithm Khintchine (1924) at length. However,
our optimal policy bound proof is based on a different treatment by Damron (2012).
1.7 Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe our model. Section 3 describes the
problem an expert faces. In Section 4 we show that the expert’s optimal policy is a threshold. Section 5 sets
bounds on the optimal policy, and Section 6 shows how to calculate it. In section 7 we summarize and offer
concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Market prediction
A market predicts the outcome of a continuous random variable X0, whose realized value x0 will be revealed
at time 0. Time is discrete and flows backwards from an initial period T , i.e., T, . . . , t, . . . , 1, 0. At any time
t > 0 the market observes x0+Zt where Zt ∼ N(0, t). We model Zt as a random walk with independent steps
Zt, . . . , Z1, i.e., Zt =
∑t
τ=1 Zτ and Zτ ∼ N(0, 1). Let the market prediction (when uninformed by experts)
be Xt := x0+Zt at time t, and let xt be the realized value. With every passing period t, the value of Zt = zt
is revealed and becomes common knowledge, and the market’s new prediction changes to xt−1 = xt − zt.
Note that the variance of Zt decreases with time, and at time 0 the market’s prediction coincides with the
true value x0. X0 is normally distributed N(0, σ
2
0), where we assume σ
2
0  T . This assumption makes
posterior computations dependent solely on observed signals, since3 we have E[X0|Xt = xt] = xt and
variance V ar(X0|Xt = xt) = t.
2.2 Expert information and goal
There is an expert, with quality q ∈ [0, 1], whose quality is common knowledge. The expert’s quality consists
in “knowing” part of the random steps Zt of every period, and therefore getting a more accurate signal of
X0. Formally,
3When a normal variable with prior distribution N(0, σ20) is sampled with known variance t at value xt, its Bayesian posterior
distribution is normal with mean
xt/t
1/σ20+1/t
and variance 1
1/σ20+1/t
. Assuming σ20  T ≥ t, this simplifies to N(xt, t).
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• For every t, Zt = At +Bt, where At ∼ N(0, q) and Bt ∼ N(0, 1− q) are mutually independent. (Note
that Zt ∼ N(0, 1).)
• The expert’s private signal at time t is Yt = x0 +B1 + . . .+Bt and let yt be its realized value. (Note
that if q = 0 then Yt = Xt and if q = 1 then Yt = x0.)
The expert may make a single prediction of the outcome, at a time of his choosing. The expert’s
predicted distribution at t is N(yt, (1 − q)t). In practice, it is enough for the expert to announce yt as his
entire distribution follows by the model and common knowledge. A prediction’s reward is determined at
time 0 based on the realized value (x0) by LMSR. (For continuous distributions, the logarithmic scoring
rule scores the log of the result probability density). Namely, if the market prediction prior to the expert
prediction is X−t ∼ N(µ−, σ−) with density f−, and following the expert prediction the posterior market
prediction is X+t ∼ N(µ+, σ+) with density f+, then the expert reward is log(f+(x0)/f−(x0)), where x0
is the realized value. An expert who refrains from making a prediction has a benefit of 0. The expert
optimization problem is to maximize his expected reward given his private information. The question before
the expert is if and when to make a prediction.
2.3 Preliminaries
The complementary cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution is conventionally
denoted by Φc(x) :=
1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e−
t2
2 dt. The following concentration inequality will be very useful for bounding
deviations of a random walk.
Lemma 2.1. Let {St} be a Gaussian random walk with N(0, 1) steps. For λ ≥ 0
1
λ+ 2
e−
λ2
2 < Pr[|St| ≥ λ
√
t] = 2 Φc(λ) ≤ e−λ
2
2
Proof. Formula 7.1.13 from Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) for x ≥ 0 is
1
x+
√
x2 + 2
< ex
2
∞∫
x
e−t
2
dt ≤ 1
x+
√
x2 + 4/pi
(1)
Let z = x
√
2, then (1) implies
1
2(z + 2)
<
√
2
pi
z +
√
z2 + 4
< ez
2/2Φc(z) ≤
√
2
pi
z +
√
z2 + 8/pi
≤ 1/2 . (2)
As Pr[|St| ≥ λ
√
t] = 2Φc(λ), the lemma follows.
3 The Expert optimization problem
Consider the case that the expert makes a prediction at time t. Let the market prediction prior to the expert
prediction be X−t ∼ N(µ−, σ2−) with density f− and the posterior market prediction be X+t ∼ N(µ+, σ2+)
with density f+. Denote expert’s reward by W .
W = log
f+(x0)
f−(x0)
= log
1
σ+
√
2pi
e
− (x0−µ+)
2
2σ2
+
1
σ−
√
2pi
e
− (x0−µ−)
2
2σ2−
= log
σ−
σ+
+
(x0 − µ−)2
2σ2−
− (x0 − µ+)
2
2σ2+
(3)
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As the reward depends on x0, its value is only known at time 0, but the expert can calculate his reward
expectation at t, based on his belief that x0 ∼ N(µ+, σ2+). This translates to x0 − µ− ∼ N(µ+ − µ−, σ2+)
and x0 − µ+ ∼ N(0, σ2+). As the second moment of the normal distribution N(µ, σ2) is µ2 + σ2, we get by
taking expectations in (3)
E
x0∼N(µ+,σ2+)
[W ] = log
σ−
σ+
+
(µ+ − µ−)2 + σ2+
2σ2−
− 0 + σ
2
+
2σ2+
=
(µ+ − µ−)2
2σ2−
+
1
2
(σ2+
σ2−
− 1− log σ
2
+
σ2−
)
Observe that the right-hand side is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the two distributions X+t and X
−
t ,
i.e.
E[W ] = DKL(X+t ||X−t ) =
(µ+ − µ−)2
2σ2−
+
1
2
(σ2+
σ2−
− 1− log σ
2
+
σ2−
)
(4)
Proposition 3.1. An expert reward expectation when making a prediction is
E[W ] =
(yt − xt)2
2t
− 1
2
(
q + log(1− q)
)
(5)
Proof. For this setting, we have µ− = xt, σ2− = t, µ+ = yt, and σ
2
+ = (1− q)t. Substituting these in (4) we
derive (5).
Note that the reward W may be positive or negative depending on x0, but its expectation is always
non-negative.
Considering the expert’s expected reward (5), we observe that the right-hand side has a term − 12
(
q +
log(1− q)) which depends only on the expert’s quality, and is strictly positive for 0 < q < 1. The other term
is non-negative. Therefore, an expert with positive quality will always make a prediction, in the last period
at the latest. The expert maximizes his expected reward by selecting a prediction time t that maximizes the
other term (yt−xt)
2
2t .
At any time t, the expert knows xt and yt, and can calculate his expected reward from an immediate
prediction at time t. However, the expert does not know yτ and xτ for any τ < t. Should the expert make
his prediction now, or wait for a higher-benefit opportunity?
Let St = (Yt − Xt)/√q = (A1 + . . . + At)/√q, hence the series {St = (Yt − Xt)/√q, t = 1, 2, . . .} is a
Gaussian random walk with N(0, 1) i.i.d. steps. The random variable S2t /t is an affine transformation of
the expert’s reward (5), so the optimal policy to maximize it is essentially identical to the optimal expert
prediction policy. From now on we consider maximizing S2t /t, which we call the Canonical Problem. For
clarity, the following is an explicit statement of the problem.
Problem 1 (Canonical Problem). Let St be a Gaussian random walk with N(0, 1) steps. Suppose an expert
is successively presented with ST , ST−1, . . . , S1. If the expert stops at t, his reward is S2t /t. How should the
expert maximize his reward?
We define the expected reward of an expert who follows the optimal strategy in the canonical prob-
lem, distinguishing between the expectation given the current value of St = c, denoted by ψt(c), and the
expectation independent from the current value, denoted by Ψ(t) = Ec[ψt(c)].
Definition 1. Denote by ψt(c) the expert’s optimal-strategy expected reward at t, conditional on St = c.
The expert’s optimal-strategy expected reward Ψ(t), is
Ψ(t) := E
c∼N(0,t)
[ψt(c)] =
1√
2pit
+∞∫
−∞
e−
c2
2t ψt(c)dc =
1√
2pi
+∞∫
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψt(x
√
t)dx
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4 The Optimal Policy is a Threshold
In this section we derive properties of the optimal strategy of the expert. In Proposition 2 we give a
recursive formula for the canonical problem’s expected reward ψt(c), and state some properties satisfied by
the function.
Later, in Proposition 3, we show that the expert’s optimal policy is a threshold policy. Namely, if he
stops for some value c he will also stop for any value c′ > c. We also show that there is always a finite
threshold, namely, for any time t there is some value θ(t) such that for c > θ(t) the expert stops.
We conclude with Proposition 4 that relates the canonical problem back to the expert’s strategy, showing
that the expert strategy depends on (xt − yt)2. An implication of this is the interesting insight that experts
with higher quality will wait with their prediction and pursue higher rewards in situations where their
lower-quality peers will not.
Proposition 4.1. 1. The optimal expected reward ψt(·) satisfies the recursion formula
ψt(c) = max
[c2
t
, ψWAITt (c)
]
(6)
where ψWAITt (c) is the expectation from waiting at least one period, and is equal to,
ψWAITt (c) =
1√
2pi t−1t
∞∫
−∞
e
− (x−
c
t
)2
2 t−1
t ψt−1(c− x)dx (7)
=
1√
2pi
∞∫
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψt−1
( t− 1
t
c−
√
t− 1
t
x
)
dx (8)
=
1√
2pi t−1t
∞∫
−∞
e
− (x−
t−1
t
c)2
2 t−1
t ψt−1(x)dx (9)
2. The conditional optimal-strategy expected reward ψt(c) is Lipschitz continuous, piecewise differentiable,
positive, even and increasing in |c|.
Proof. We first prove the first part of the Proposition. The expert’s expectation is the maximum between
the benefit for stopping (which is c2/t, since St = c), and the benefit for waiting at least one period. If the
expert chooses to wait, and the value of St−1 is c− x, his benefit will be ψt−1(c− x). For every real x, the
probability density for this is
Pr[St−1 = c− x|St = c] = Pr[St−1 = c− x] Pr[St − St−1 = x]
Pr[St = c]
=
1√
2pi t−1t
exp
{
−1
2
(
(c− x)2
t− 1 + x
2 − c
2
t
)}
=
1√
2pi t−1t
exp
{
− (x−
c
t )
2
2 t−1t
}
,
and so the expectation for waiting is ψt−1(c− x) averaged over this conditional probability for each x,
ψWAITt (c) =
1√
2pi t−1t
∞∫
−∞
e
− (x−
c
t
)2
2 t−1
t ψt−1(c− x)dx (10)
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This completes the proof of (7). (8) is derived from (10) by substituting x→
√
t−1
t x+
c
t , while (9) is derived
from it by substituting x→ c− x.
We now prove the second part of the Proposition. We prove the claim by induction on t. For t = 1, the
expert stops for every c so ψ1(c) = c
2 for which the claim holds. Assume the claim holds for t− 1. Then by
(6) and (7) ψt(c) is positive, even, Lipschitz continuous and piecewise differentiable. It remains to show that
ψt is increasing in |c|. In any range where ψt(c) = c2/t it is increasing in |c|. Elsewhere, we differentiate (9)
with respect to c,
d
dc
ψt(c) =
1√
2pi t−1t
∞∫
−∞
(
x− t− 1
t
c
)
e
− (x−
t−1
t
c)2
2 t−1
t ψt−1(x)dx
=
1√
2pi t−1t
∞∫
−∞
xe
− x2
2 t−1
t ψt−1
( t− 1
t
c+ x
)
dx
=
1√
2pi t−1t
∞∫
0
xe
− x2
2 t−1
t
[
ψt−1
( t− 1
t
c+ x
)
− ψt−1
( t− 1
t
c− x
)]
dx
where the second identity uses the substitution x→ t−1t c+ x.
For x ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, we have that | t−1t c + x| ≥ | t−1t c − x|. As by the induction hypothesis ψt−1(c) is
non-decreasing in |c|, the integrand is non-negative, and so is the integral. Hence, ψ′t(c) ≥ 0.
Next we state and prove a proposition that says that the optimal policy is a threshold, and show that
for every t the threshold is finite.
Proposition 4.2. Define θ(t) to be the smallest c ≥ 0 for which ψt(c) = c2/t. For every t, θ(t) exists, and
the optimal strategy in the canonical problem is to stop at the first t for which |St| ≥ θ(t).
Proof. We need to show that there is a c such that ψt(c) = c
2/t, and that it is optimal to stop for |St| ≥ c.
The latter claim we show by showing that if it is optimal to stop for |St| = c then it is also optimal for
|St| > c. We prove both parts of this claim by induction on t, the first part by proving a stronger statement,
that ψt(c)− c2/t is non-increasing in |c|.
For t = 1, θ(1) = 0, i.e., the expert stops for any value of S1, and ψ1(c) − c2 = 0 is constant and so
non-increasing.
Our induction hypothesis is that θ(t − 1) exists, and that ψt−1(c) − c2/(t − 1) is non-increasing in
|c|. By Proposition 2 ψt−1 is an even function, hence, its derivative is an odd function. For c ≥ 0 we
have ψ′t−1(c) − (2c)/(t − 1) ≤ 0 and for c < 0, ψ′t−1(c) − (2c)/(t − 1) = ψ′t−1(−|c|) + (2|c|)/(t − 1) =
−ψ′t−1(|c|) + (2|c|)/(t− 1) ≥ 0. Therefore,
|ψ′t−1(c)| ≤
2|c|
t− 1 (11)
Within any segment in which ψt(c) = c
2/t, |ψ′t(c)| = 2|c|t . Elsewhere, i.e., where ψt(c) > c2/t, we
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differentiate (8) with respect to c, then substitute x→
√
t−1
t c−
√
t
t−1x
ψ′t(c) =
1√
2pi
t− 1
t
∞∫
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψ′t−1
( t− 1
t
c−
√
t− 1
t
x
)
dx
=
1√
2pi
√
t− 1
t
∞∫
−∞
exp
{
− (
t−1
t c− x)2
2 t−1t
}
ψ′t−1(x)dx
=
1√
2pi
√
t− 1
t
∞∫
0
[
exp
{
− (
t−1
t c− x)2
2 t−1t
}
− exp
{
− (
t−1
t c+ x)
2
2 t−1t
}]
ψ′t−1(x)dx ,
where the last equality relies on the fact that ψ′t−1, the derivative of an even function, is odd. As for
c ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, exp
{
− ( t−1t c−x)2
2 t−1t
}
− exp
{
− ( t−1t c+x)2
2 t−1t
}
≥ 0, we can apply (11) to derive (when ψt(c) > c2/t)
ψ′t(c) ≤
1√
2pi
√
t− 1
t
∞∫
0
[
exp
{
− (
t−1
t c− x)2
2 t−1t
}
− exp
{
− (
t−1
t c+ x)
2
2 t−1t
}] 2x
t− 1dx
=
1√
2pi
√
t− 1
t
∞∫
−∞
exp
{
− (
t−1
t c− x)2
2 t−1t
}
2x
t− 1dx
=
t− 1
t
2 t−1t c
t− 1 =
2(t− 1)c
t2
In summary, whenever ψt(c) > c
2/t we have,
|ψ′t(c)| ≤
2(t− 1)|c|
t2
<
2|c|
t
. (12)
We conclude |ψ′t(c)| ≤ 2|c|t for every c and so ψt(c) − c2/t is non-increasing in |c|. Since ψt(c) − c2/t ≥ 0,
and, if θ(t) exists, ψt(θ(t)) − θ2(t)/t = 0, we conclude ψt(c) − c2/t = 0 for all |c| ≥ θ(t). I.e., the expert
should stop whenever |St| ≥ θ(t).
It remains to be shown that θ(t) exists. To show that, it is enough to show that for some c′, stopping is
at least as beneficial as waiting, i.e., that
ψWAITt (c
′) ≤ c
′2
t
. (13)
By (12), for c ≥ 0
ψWAITt (c) ≤ ψt(0) +
c∫
0
2(t− 1)|x|
t2
dx = ψt(0) +
(t− 1)c2
t2
.
Substituting any c′ ≥ t√ψt(0) in the above satisfies (13), since we have ψWAITt (c′) ≤ tψt(0) ≤ c′2/t.
Therefore,
θ(t) ≤ t
√
ψt(0) . (14)
The expert’s optimal policy and expectation now follows
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Proposition 4.3. 1. At time t, a prediction made by an expert with quality q maximizes his expected
reward if and only if
(yt − xt)2 ≥ qθ2(t)
2. The expert’s expected reward from following this policy for every t is
E[W |yt, xt] = 1
2
qψt
(yt − xt√
q
)
− 1
2
(
q + log(1− q)
)
(15)
where xt is the market prediction and yt the expert’s prediction at time t.
Proof. As noted in Section 3, (Yt − Xt)/√q is a Gaussian random walk with N(0, 1) steps. Using the
solution of the Canonical Problem, the expert should predict when |(yt − xt)/√q| > θ(t). In other words,
when (yt − xt)2 > qθ2(t).
The expert’s expected reward was given in (5), where it was noted that the time-dependent term is
(yt − xt)2/(2t). In the Canonical Problem, he would be maximizing (yt − xt)2/(qt) for an expected gain of
ψt(c) = ψt
(
yt−xt√
q
)
. In his actual prediction problem, he would be maximizing (yt − xt)2/(2t), i.e., q/2 times
his Canonical Problem target.
We observe from Proposition 4 that given the same observations yt, xt, experts with different qualities
may make different decisions regarding the timing of predictions
• Experts with q < (yt−xt)2θ2(t) will make a prediction.
• Experts with q > (yt−xt)2θ2(t) will wait.
Thus a high-quality expert will remain silent in a situation where a low-quality expert will speak. However,
since qualities are limited to 1, all experts, regardless of their quality, should make a prediction when
|yt − xt| > θ(t)
5 Bounds on the Optimal Policy
In this section we derive upper and lower bounds on the expectation of the reward of the optimal policy. The
proof is based on proofs of the Law of the Iterated Logarithm (LIL), but with several important differences.
The LIL (Hartman and Wintner (1941)) states that in a random walk, where the increments are N(0, 1),
the maximum deviation is
√
2t log log t with probability 1. Namely, for any  > 0, the deviation, with
probability one, is greater than
√
2(1− )t log log t at infinitely many times t, and only at finite number of
times t greater than
√
2(1 + )t log log t.
In our proof, we consider finite error bounds, and are not satisfied with probability one results. For the
optimal policy, in our setting, it is sufficient to have a single high value, and there is no need to have the
event occur infinitely often. This implies that we need to consider a more refined bound.
Another difference is that we consider the deviations for all t ≤ T for a given T . When we consider
the expert utility, its expected value is with respect to the global time horizon T , and not with respect
to the current time. Technically, this results in a different threshold from the LIL: We set the threshold
to be Φ(t) :=
√
2t log log T , while the LIL sets
√
2t log log t. The reason for this is that we are interested
in bounding an expert’s expectation as a function of the time horizon T . Proving that the LIL bound is
exceeded (or not) does not serve to establish a bound on the expert’s expectation at T , since the benefit is a
function of t, and not of T . On the other hand, assigning a probability that a deviation of Φ(t) is exceeded
is equivalent to assigning a probability that the expert’s reward exceeds Φ2(t)/t = 2 log log T , a function of
T .
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Our bound Φ(t) is higher than the LIL’s bound of
√
2t log log t, as T ≥ t. Exceeding it does not contradict
the LIL, first, since it might exceed only once and not infinitely often, and second, since it is not claimed
that for any time t in which it holds we have log log T/ log log t > 1 +  with probability 1 for some fixed
 > 0.
Recall that Ψ(T ) is the expected value of the optimal policy for a time horizon T . The following
proposition places upper and lower bounds on the expectation of the optimal policy, i.e., Ψ(T ).
Proposition 5.1. For every  > 0 and T > 10
Ψ(T ) ≤ (1 + )2 log log T + γ1(T, )
and for every 1/2 >  > 0 and T > 16
Ψ(T ) ≥ (1− γ2(T, ))(1− )2 log log T
where
γ1(T, ) :=
12
log
(
1 +
(
√
1+−
√
1+/2)2
1+/2
) 1
(log T )/2
γ2(T, ) := exp
(
− (log T )
/4−2/64
(1− /8)√2 log log T + 2 ·
1
log 202
)
+
1
(log T )/8
In order to get a better understanding of the magnitude of the γs note that for  ∈ [0, 1] we have,
γ1(T, ) <
12
log(1 + 2/4)
1
(log T )/2
<
96
2
1
(log T )/2
= O
( 1
2(log T )/2
)
(16)
and for  < 0.2 and log log T > 16/2 we have
γ2(T, ) = O(exp{−(log T )/16})
and in fact we can make the exponent /16 much closer to /4.
The proof of Proposition 5 will be done in two parts. First, for the upper bound, in Lemma 5.1. Second,
for the lower bound, in Lemma 5.3. We start with the upper bound.
Lemma 5.1. For every  > 0 and T > 10,
Ψ(T ) ≤ (1 + )2 log log T + γ1(T, )
where
γ1(T, ) :=
12
log
(
1 +
(
√
1+−
√
1+/2)2
1+/2
) 1
(log T )/2
Here is an overview of the proof, which is found in the Appendix: Instead of bounding Ψ(T ), we bound
a larger quantity, the expected value of MT , defined as the maximum of S
2
t /t for t ≤ T . For this we need to
bound the probability that MT > (1+ )2 log log T , and the expectation of MT will follow by integrating this
probability over . Therefore our probability bound must also be tight enough to assure that this integral
does not diverge.
We partition the time [1, T ] to a logarithmic number of gaps, with endpoints ak where a = 1 + Θ(2).
This implies that we have loga(T ) = Θ(
−2 log T ) such endpoints. We show that with high probability, for
any endpoint ak the probability that the deviation is more than
√
2ak log log T times 1+Θ() is significantly
less than 1/(loga T ). Since there are loga T such endpoints, a union bound makes it hold for all endpoints
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by a probability close to 1. The next step is to bound the deviation within the gaps (ak, ak+1]. For this we
use an inequality attributed to Levy which relates the probability of a deviation of each single time to the
probability of deviation of the maximum over all the time points. Our bound for Pr[MT > (1 + )2 log log T ]
is a union bound of the endpoints bound and the gaps bound. This gives us a high probability bound for MT .
To complete the proof, we integrate over the failure probabilities to get an upper bound on the expectation
of MT .
We establish a lower bound of for Ψ(T ) by first lower bounding MT .
Lemma 5.2. For every 0 <  < 1/2 and every T > 16
Pr[MT > 2(1− ) log log T ] ≥ 1− γ2(T, )
The proof of this lemma is in the Appendix. Here is an overview of it: We show that with high probability
MT is large enough. This will establish a lower bound for a simple, non-optimal policy and therefore also a
lower bound for Ψ(T ).
As in the upper bound, to bound MT we again partition the time [1, T ] to a logarithmic number of gaps,
with endpoints ak where a > 1. (Unlike the case of the upper bound, where a = 1+Θ(), for the lower bound
we use a = Θ(−2), and hence there are huge gaps between ak and ak+1.) We lower-bound the deviation
within each gap, and, using the independence of the gaps establish that with probability close to 1 one of
the gaps (ak, ak+1] will have a large enough relative deviation. We also show that, with high probability, no
endpoint Sak is “too negative”. Combining the large deviation within the gap and its not-too-negative value
at its start leads to our desired bound.
We can now complete the lower bound proof for Ψ(T ).
Lemma 5.3. For every 1/2 >  > 0 and T > 16,
Ψ(T ) ≥ (1− γ2(T, ))(1− )2 log log T
where
γ2(T, ) := exp
(
− (log T )
/4−2/64
(1− /8)√2 log log T + 2 ·
1
log 202
)
+
1
(log T )/8
Proof. Lemma 5.2 suggests the following stopping strategy: Choose 0 <  < 1/2, and use a stopping strategy
of S2t /t > (1 − )2 log log T . The expected reward from this is at least (1 − γ2(T, ))(1 − )2 log log T . The
optimal strategy has at least the expected reward of any strategy, therefore
Ψ(T ) ≥ (1− γ2(T, ))(1− )2 log log T (17)
for every 0 <  < 1/2.
Corollary 5.1. For log log T ≥ 4 we have
−32 log log log T − 8 ≤ Ψ(T )− 2 log log T ≤ 8 log log log T + 6
The proof of the corollary is in the Appendix. The corollary implies that
lim
T→∞
Ψ(T )
2 log log T
= 1,
but in fact provides a much more refined convergence bound, showing that the low-order term is of the order
of only log log log T .
From Proposition 5 and (14), and observing that ψt(·) is minimized at zero, using Corollary 1, we derive
the following upper bound on the threshold.
Corollary 5.2. For log log T ≥ 35,
θ(t) ≤ t
√
ψt(0) ≤ t
√
2 log log T + 8 log log log T + 6 ≤ t
√
3 log log T
However, the bound given above is far from tight. We conjecture that,
θ(t) = Θ(
√
t log log t) . (18)
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Figure 1: Algorithm to compute optimal policy
Algorithm 1. Parameters: Rectangle width γ, integration bounds `, h, maximum time T .
1. θ[t] is an array [1..T ], and psi[t, i] is and array [1..T, 1..T/γ]
2. initialize: θ[1]← 0
3. functions: x(i, c, t) :=
√
t−1
t
c−
√
t
t−1 iγ.
psi∗(t, i) := IF |iγ| < θ[t] THEN return psi[t, i] ELSE return (iγ)2/t.
4. FOR t = 2, 3, . . . , T
j=0;
(a) DO
c = jγ; StopV alue← c2/t
WaitV alue← 1√
2pi
∑
`/γ≤i≤h/γ
e−
x2i
2 psi∗(t− 1, i)γ;
psi[t, j]← max{WaitV alue, StopV alue};
UNTIL StopV alue ≥WaitV alue;
θ(t)← c
END-FOR
6 Computing an Approximate Optimal Policy
6.1 Algorithm and Error Bound
We show how to approximate optimal policy by an efficient algorithm, based on the recurrence formula (6).
Our algorithm (Figure 1) receives a parameter γ > 0 which controls its accuracy.
The algorithm iteratively uses the rectangle method, with given rectangle width γ, for approximating
the integral in (8). Namely it approximates
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx,
where b(x) := t−1t c −
√
t−1
t x. Values of ψt−1 in this expression are taken from values computed in the
previous iteration.
First, we bound the error in approximating the integral by truncating the tails. (See the Appendix for
proof.)
Lemma 6.1. For  ∈ (0, 1), h ≥√6 log(2T/), and ` = −h, we have
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx− 1√
2pi
∫ h
`
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx ≤ 
2T
where b(x) := t−1t c−
√
t−1
t x
Next we use a standard approximation using the rectangle method.
Lemma 6.2. For γ =
√
/(T log T log log T ), and h = −` = √6 log(2T/),∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√2pi
∫ h
`
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx− 1√
2pi
∑
`/γ<i<h/γ
e−
x2i
2 ψt−1(iγ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2T
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where xi :=
√
t−1
t c−
√
t
t−1 iγ.
Proof. We are using the rectangle method using width γ over the interval [`, h]. The error for the rectangle
method is bounded by (h−`)γ
2
24 K where |ψ′′t−1(ξ)| ≤ K for any ξ ∈ [`, h]. By Lemma D.1 we have that
K ≤ 3 + θ
2(t)
t
≤ 3t log log T + 3
t
≤ 4T log log T
This implies that the error is at most
1√
2pi
(h− `)γ2
24
K ≤ 1√
2pi
2
√
6 log(2T/)
24

T 2 log2 T (log log T )2
4T log log T ≤ 
2T
Proposition 6.1. Let γ =
√
/(T log T log log T ), and h = −` = √6 log(2T/). Then,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx− 1√
2pi
∑
`/γ<i<h/γ
e−
x2i
2 ψ∗t−1(iγ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ tT
where b(x) := t−1t c−
√
t−1
t x and xi :=
√
t−1
t c−
√
t
t−1 iγ.
Proof. By Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2 we have,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx− 1√
2pi
∑
`/γ<i<h/γ
e−
x2i
2 ψt−1(iγ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ T
We now show the proof by induction on t. Clearly it holds for t = 1. For the inductive step for t− 1 we have
|ψ∗t−1(iγ)− ψt−1(iγ)| ≤ (t− 1)/T . We now compute ψ∗t based on ψ∗t−1 and have∣∣∣∣∣∣ψ∗t (c)− 1√2pi
∑
`/γ<i<h/γ
e−
x2i
2 ψt−1(iγ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√2pi
∑
`/γ<i<h/γ
e−
x2i
2 ψ∗t−1(iγ)−
1√
2pi
∑
`/γ<i<h/γ
e−
x2i
2 ψt−1(iγ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 
T
+
1√
2pi
∑
`/γ<i<h/γ
e−
x2i
2
∣∣ψ∗t−1(iγ)− ψt−1(iγ)∣∣
≤ 
T
+
(t− 1)
T
=
t
T
where we used the fact that 1√
2pi
∑
`/γ<i<h/γ e
− x
2
i
2 ≤ 1.
We now bound the running time of our algorithm.
Proposition 6.2. Algorithm of Figure 1 runs in time O˜(T 4/) and computes an  approximation of the
optimal policy.
Proof. Each computation ofWaitV alue takes (h−`)/γ = O(√6 log(2T/)(T log T log log T )/√) = O˜(T/√)
steps, and period t calculates it θ(t)/γ = O(t
√
log log T (T log T log log T )/
√
) = O˜(T 2/
√
) times. There are
T periods, hence, the running time is O˜((T/
√
)(T 2/
√
)T ) = O˜(T 4/).
As a supplementary step to the algorithm, the expert’s expected optimal reward Ψ(T ) may be calculated
from its definition in Definition 1, using numeric integration (e.g., with the rectangle method), without
significant addition to error or running time.
Assuming that our conjectured bounds, as given in (18) and (25), hold, the algorithm is significantly
faster: The integration rectangle width γ can be widened by a factor of O(
√
T ), for a gain of O(T ) in
running time. Due to the lower bound on θ(t), the number of rectangles is reduced by a further factor of
O(
√
T ) for an overall O(T 1.5) improvement, and an algorithm completing in O˜(T 2.5/) steps
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Figure 2: Optimal expert policy and expectation
Figure 3: Canonical expectation dependency on signal
6.2 Empirical Simulation
We have derived the exact bound using an empirical method, and the results show that indeed our theoretical
bounds are very close to the correct bounds.
The result of such a calculation, for up to T = 10, 000, 000 (ln lnT ' 2.78), is shown in Figure 2, where
the expected reward is plotted against the time horizon (on a log-log scale). The figure has the optimal
prediction threshold (shown in the form θ2(t)/t, i.e., the benefit of predicting with |St| = θ(t)), the expert’s
expectation with St = 0, i.e., ψt(0), and the reference 2 log log t.
In Figure 3 the canonical expectation profile at t = 10, 000, 000 is shown for all values St = c up to
c < θ(t) ' 8, 000. For t ≥ θ(t), the expectation equals c2/t, which is plotted in reference.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Conclusions
We analyzed the expert’s policy in the prediction scenario described, and found that the expert’s optimal
strategy is to adopt a policy that aims to maximize the value of (yt − xt)2/t. To do so the expert adopts a
prediction threshold based on his deviation from the market value |yt − xt| ≥ √qθ(t) where q is his quality,
and θ is a slowly increasing function of the time left t. His expected benefit from this optimal policy includes
a positive term that depends on q only, and a time-varying, slowly increasing term which is proportional to
q and a function ψt(c) of the time left t and his current deviation from the market c. The expert’s expected
optimal reawrd Ψ(T ) is roughly 2 log log T , with bounds on the deviations.
Our results show that higher-quality experts should hold their silence where lower-quality experts are
advised to speak. It also shows that an expert’s reward expectation increases with the time left, albeit slowly.
Receiving a large reward depends on having a prediction with a significant deviation from the market’s, which
may require waiting.
7.2 Structure of our random walk
Our random walk has an intricate structure which is neither a super-martingale nor a sub-martingale. Let
us slightly elaborate more on the issue. As Section 3 shows, the expert aims to maximize S2t /t. A simple
analysis (not shown) will show that when S2t /t > 1, E[S
2
τ/τ |St] < S2t /t for all τ < t, the definition of a
super-martingale, while when S2t /t < 1, E[S
2
τ/τ |St] > S2t /t for all τ < t, the definition of a sub-martingale.
Does this not simply mean that the expert should use the threshold S2t /t = 1? After all, above this
threshold, his target is expected to decrease, while below this threshold, his target is expected to increase.
Waiting with S2t /t above 1 would appear to have the same fault as the Martingale betting system, i.e.,
expecting to make gains in a losing situation.
The reason that this is not so is that the expert’s future is not consistently a super-martingale, but will
turn into a sub-martingale when crossing the 1 threshold. This virtually guarantees a reward of close to 1,
a feature that is absent in the gambler’s fallacy. When S2t /t > 1, the expert’s downside is capped at close to
1, but his upside is unbounded. This motivates (up to a point, set by θ2(t)/t) the expert to wait in what is
an apparently losing situation.
7.3 Other Random Walks and Scoring Rules
While our analysis used Gaussian random walks, and the logarithmic scoring rule, we believe, with some
justification, that other random walks and other scoring rules will have similar qualitative results.
In particular, for other random walks, we note that Proposition 5 depends on the type of random walk
only via Lemma 2.1. Once similar bounds are established for a random walk with non-Gaussian steps, the
proof, with suitable modifications, may hold. For the Simple Symmetric Random Walk (with ±1 steps), we
calculated an equivalent of the algorithm of Figure 1 in Section 6, to verify that its behavior differs only
slightly from the behavior shown in Figures 2 and 3.
7.4 Future Work
An immediate open problem is a better characterization of the threshold function θ(t), hopefully showing
that it is Θ(
√
t log log t). However, there are many more conceptual open problems that we leave for future
research.
While we gave a fairly precise characterization of the optimal expected reward of the expert, this does
not characterize when the expert is likely to speak. More specifically: What is the mean time to prediction?
With given initial deviation? Averaged over deviations? It appears that, on average, an expert will wait
most of the time left. What if the expert is given a deadline for prediction? For example, if the expert must
predict before t = 10, or before a given fraction of the initial time t = T/k?
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Generalizing to more than one expert brings up a wide array of interesting questions, including how to
model the correlation between the experts’ signals. The expert’s problem is greatly altered when all experts
are strategic, and remains so even if we assume that only one expert is strategic, with the rest scheduled to
disclose their predictions at predetermined times.
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A Proof of lemma 5.1
Proof. Define Φ(t) :=
√
2t log log T , t ≤ T . Define MT := max1≤t≤T S2t /t. To establish an upper bound for
Φ(T ), we compute an upper bound for E[MT ], noting that E[MT ] ≥ Ψ(T ). Because, selecting (in hindsight)
the t that maximizes S2t /t will always perform at least as well as any stopping strategy (which precludes
hindsight).
For every  > 0 set a := a() := 1 +
(
√
1+−
√
1+/2)2
1+/2 . Note that when  > 0, a() is increasing and in the
interval (1, 4− 2√2).
By Lemma 2.1, for λ =
√
(1 + /2)2 log log T , we have
Pr[|St| ≥ Φ(t)
√
1 + /2] ≤ (log T )−(1+/2)
We bound |St| for every t = ak ≤ T with integer k (in a slight abuse of notation, ak refers to its integer
part). Using a union bound, we have,
[loga T ]∑
k=0
Pr[|Sak | ≥ Φ(ak)
√
1 + /2] <
loga T
(log T )1+/2
=
1
(log a)(log T )/2
(19)
Next we bound the deviations inside an interval. Define δk as follows
δk := max
t∈(ak,ak+1]
Pr[|St − Sak | ≥ Φ(ak)(
√
1 + −
√
1 + /2)]
≤ max
t∈(ak,ak+1]
exp
{
−Φ
2(ak)(
√
1 + −√1 + /2)2
2(t− ak)
}
≤ exp
{
− (
√
1 + −√1 + /2)22 log log T
2(a− 1)
}
= exp {−(1 + /2) log log T} = (log T )−(1+/2)
where the first inequality uses Lemma 2.1 over the t− ak time steps from ak. The second inequality follows
since ak/(t− ak) > 1/(a− 1) for t ∈ (ak, ak+1].
By definition, δk bounds the probability that any single element will exceed the bound, but we need to
bound the probability that the maximum element will exceed the bound. The following inequality comes
very handy in relating the two quantities.
Lemma A.1 (Levy’s Inequality, see Lemma 1.2 in Damron (2012)). Assume that for some δ > 0 and λ > 0
we have Pr[|St| ≥ λ/2] ≤ δ for all t = 1, . . . , T . Then
Pr[ max
t=1,...,T
|St| ≥ λ] ≤ δ
1− δ
Since St − Sak is distributed like St−ak , using Lemma A.1 we have,
Pr[ max
t∈(ak,ak+1]
|St − Sak | ≥ Φ(ak)(
√
1 + −
√
1 + /2)] ≤ δk
1− δk ≤
2
(log T )1+/2
,
where we use the fact that for T > 10 we have that (log T )−1 < 1/2 and therefore 1− δk ≥ 1/2. Using union
bound, the probability that for any k we have maxt∈(ak,ak+1] |St − Sak | ≥ Φ(ak)(
√
1 +  −√1 + /2), is at
most
2 loga T
(log T )1+/2
=
2
(log a)(log T )/2
. (20)
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Combining (19) and (20), assuming the high probability events hold, for t ∈ (ak, ak+1] we have that,
|St| ≤ |St − Sak |+ |Sak | ≤ Φ(ak)(
√
1 + −
√
1 + /2) + Φ(ak)
√
1 + /2
= Φ(ak)
√
1 +  ≤ Φ(t)√1 + 
holds for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T with probability at least 1− δ() where,
δ() :=
1 + 2
(log a())(log T )/2
=
3
(log a())(log T )/2
.
Rephrasing this in terms of MT
Pr[MT > (1 + )2 log log T ] ≤ δ().
To bound E[MT ], by the definition of expectation
E[MT ]− (1 + )2 log log T ≤ 2 log log T
∞∫

Pr[MT > (1 + x)2 log log T ]dx
Therefore
E[MT ]− (1 + )2 log log T ≤ 2 log log T
∞∫

δ(x)dx
≤ 6 log log T
log a()
∞∫

(log T )−x/2dx =
6 log log T
log a()
∞∫

e−x(log log T )/2dx
≤ 6 log log T
log a()
[
2
log log T
(log T )−x/2
]∞

=
12
(log a())
1
(log T )/2
= γ1()
This implies that Ψ(T ) ≤ E[MT ] ≤ (1 + )2 log log T + γ1(), which completes the proof of the lemma.
B proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof. Define Φ(t) :=
√
2t log log T , t ≤ T . Define MT := max1≤t≤T S2t /t. By Lemma 2.1, for λ =
(1− ρ)√2 log log T , we have,
Pr[St ≥ (1− ρ)
√
2t log log T ] ≥ 1
(1− ρ)√2 log log T + 2 ·
1
(log T )(1−ρ)2
(21)
As before, we consider the sequence of times ak with integer k. This time we set a := a() := 20/2.
Assuming  < 1/2, this guarantees that,
(1 + /8)Φ(ak−1) ≤ (/4)Φ(ak) (22)
and also
(1− /8)Φ(ak − ak−1) ≥ (1− /4)Φ(ak) . (23)
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We define Rk := Sak−Sak−1 . Note that the Rk are mutually independent and Rk is distributed like Sak−ak−1 .
Consider the events Pr[Rk ≥ (1− /4)Φ(ak)] for every k such that ak ≤ T . For each Rk we have,
Pr[Rk ≥ (1− /4)Φ(ak)] = Pr[Sak−ak−1 ≥ (1− /4)Φ(ak)]
≥ Pr[Sak−ak−1 ≥ (1− /8)Φ(ak − ak−1)]
≥ (log T )
−(1−/8)2
(1− /8)√2 log log T + 2 ,
where the first inequality uses (23) and the second uses (21).
We need to lower bound the probability that at least one of these events, i.e., Rk ≥ (1− /4)Φ(ak), will
occur. The probability that none will occur is at most(
1− (log T )
−(1−/8)2
(1− /8)√2 log log T + 2
)loga T
< δ1 := exp
(
− (log T )
/4−2/64
(1− /8)√2 log log T + 2 ·
1
log a
)
since (1− b/x)x < e−b for x > b > 0.
Therefore with probability at least 1 − δ1 for at least one k the event occurs. We now show that, with
high probability the value of Sak is not too negative. By Lemma 2.1, for λ = (1 + /8)
√
2 log log T , we have,
Pr[Sak−1 ≤ −(1 + /8)Φ(ak−1)] ≤ δ2 := (log T )−(1+/8)
So the event Pr[∀k : Sak−1 > −(1+/8)Φ(ak−1)] occurs with probability at least 1−δ3 where δ3 := (loga T )δ2.
Therefore, with probability at least 1− δ1 − δ3 we have
Sak = Rk + Sak−1 ≥ (1− /4)Φ(ak)− (1 + /8)Φ(ak−1)
≥ (1− /4)Φ(ak)− (/4)Φ(ak)
= (1− /2)Φ(ak) ,
where the second inequality uses (22). Since Pr[MT < 2(1 − ) log log T ] ≤ Pr[MT < 2(1 − /2)2 log log T ],
the lemma follows.
C proof of corollary 1
Proof. By Lemma 5.1 we have for any 1,
Ψ(T )− 2 log log T ≤ 21 log log T + γ1(T, 1).
We set 1 =
4 log log log T
log log T . Using Eq. (16) we have that
γ1(T, 1) <
96
21
1
(log T )1/2
=
6(log log T )2
(log log log T )2
e−2 log log log T =
6
(log log log T )2
This implies that
Ψ(T )− 2 log log T ≤ 8 log log log T + 6
(log log log T )2
≤ 8 log log log T + 6,
which, using the fact that T ≥ e16, gives the upper bound in the corollary.
By Lemma 5.3 we have for any 2,
−(γ2(T, 2) + 2)2 log log T ≤ Ψ(T )− 2 log log T.
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We set 2 =
16 log log log T
log log T < 1.
γ2(T, ) := exp
(
− (log T )
/4−2/64
(1− /8)√2 log log T + 2 ·
1
log 202
)
+
1
(log T )/8
≤ exp
(
− (log T )
/8
√
2 log log T + 2
)
+
1
(log T )/8
For 2 we have
γ2(T, 2) ≤ exp
(
− (log log T )
2
√
2 log log T + 2
)
+
1
(log log T )2
≤ 1
log T
+
1
(log log T )2
≤ 2
(log log T )2
,
where we used the fact that T ≥ e16. This implies that
Ψ(T )− 2 log log T ≥ −
( 4
(log log T )2
+
16 log log log T
log log T
)
2 log log T = −32 log log log T − 8 ,
again, using T ≥ e16.
D Second derivative
The following lemma bounds the second derivative of ψt(c), a bound we will need in the Section 6.
Lemma D.1. For every t > 1, c, − θ2(t)t < ψ′′t (c) < 3+θ
2(t−1)
t .
4
Proof. Refereing to (6), whenever ψt(c) =
c2
t , ψ
′′
t (c) =
2
t . This value is within the lemma bounds, proving
the lemma for this case.
Otherwise, i.e., when c < θ(t), we differentiate (9) twice.
ψ′′t (c) =
1√
2pi t−1t
∞∫
−∞
d2
d2c
[
e
− (x−
t−1
t
c)2
2 t−1
t
]
ψt−1(x)dx
=
1√
2pi t−1t
∞∫
−∞
[
(x− t− 1
t
c)2 − t− 1
t
]
e
− (x−
t−1
t
c)2
2 t−1
t ψt−1(x)dx
=
t− 1
t
1√
2pi
∞∫
−∞
(x2 − 1)e− x
2
2 ψt−1
( t− 1
t
c−
√
t− 1
t
x
)
dx
Therefore, by (8)
t
t− 1ψ
′′
t (c) + ψt(c) =
1√
2pi
∞∫
−∞
x2e−
x2
2 ψt−1
( t− 1
t
c−
√
t− 1
t
x
)
dx (24)
Since the right-hand side of (24) is positive, ψ′′t (c) ≥ − t−1t ψt(c) ≥ −ψt(c) ≥ − θ
2(t)
t , as the lemma claims.
As for every y ψt(y) ≤ max(y
2
t ,
θ2(t)
t ) ≤ y
2
t +
θ2(t)
t , and x
2e−
x2
2 is positive, we infer from (24)
t
t− 1ψ
′′
t (c) + ψt(c) ≤
1
(t− 1)√2pi
∞∫
−∞
x2e−
x2
2
[( t− 1
t
c−
√
t− 1
t
x
)2
+ θ2(t− 1)
]
dx
=
1
t− 1
[( t− 1
t
c
)2
+ 3
t− 1
t
+ θ2(t− 1)
]
4We can prove that ψ′′t (c) ≥ 0, but skip this claim and its proof, as it contributes little to the issue at hand.
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since the second, third and fourth moments of the standard normal distribution are 1, 0 and 3, respectively.
As ψt(c) >
c2
t , the above leads to
ψ′′t (c) <
3(t− 1)
t2
+
θ2(t− 1)
t
<
3 + θ2(t− 1)
t
as claimed.
The bound given in Lemma D.1 seems to be far from tight. Though we cannot provide a proof, the
following better bound seems to hold
ψ′′t (c) = O
( log log t
t
)
(25)
E Proof of Lemma 6.1
Proof. Note that,
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx− 1√
2pi
∫ h
`
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx =
1√
2pi
∫ `
−∞
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx+
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
h
e−
x2
2 ψt−1(b(x))dx,
and since ` = −h the value of the two summed integrals is identical. We consider the integral with h.
Recall the following simple identities:∫ ∞
h
e−z
2/2dz = Φc(h)
√
2pi (26)∫ ∞
h
ze−z
2/2dz = [−e−z2/2]∞h = e−h
2/2 (27)∫ ∞
h
z2e−z
2/2dz = [−ze−z2/2]∞h +
∫ ∞
h
e−z
2/2dz = he−h
2/2 + Φc(h)
√
2pi (28)
Therefore, for any quadratic function, by Lemma 2.1
∞∫
h
(a0 + a1z + a2z
2)e−
z2
2 dz = (a0 + a2)Φc(h)
√
2pi + (a1 + a2h)e
−h2/2
<
(√2pi
2
|a0|+
√
2pi
2
|a2|+ |a2|h+ |a1|
)
e−
h2
2 (29)
So, to bound
∞∫
h
ψt−1(b(x))e−
x2
2 dx, we use the following inequality
ψt(b(x)) ≤ b
2(x) + θ2(t)
t
≤ c
2 + 2cx+ x2 + θ2(t)
t
Substituting in (29), with |a0| = c
2+θ2(t−1)
t−1 , |a1| = 2|c|t−1 , |a2| = 1t−1
∞∫
h
ψt−1(b(x))e−
x2
2 dx <
(√2pic2 +√2piθ2(t− 1)
2(t− 1) +
2|c|
t− 1 +
3/2 + h
t− 1
)
e−
h2
2
≤
√
2pi
2(t− 1)
[
c2 + θ2(t− 1) + 4|c|√
2pi
+
3√
2pi
+ 2
√
3
pi
log
2T

]( 
2T
)3
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Since  < 1, noting that |c| ≤ θ(t−1), and recalling that by Corollary 2 we have θ2(t−1) < 3(t−1)2 log log T ,
then
1√
2pi
∞∫
h
ψt−1(b(x))e−
x2
2 dx ≤
4θ2(t− 1) + 2 + 22
√
log 2T
(2(t− 1))(2T 2)

4T
≤
15(t− 1) log log T
2T 2
+
2 + 22
√
log 2T
(2(t− 1))(2T 2)
 
4T
≤ 
4T
and the lemma follows for T ≥ 4.
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